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I. Introduction
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, almost all sub-Saharan African
countries gained their political independence from colonial rule on a
formular of multi-party democracy. In the former British colonies in
particular, competitive political party politics were organised over long
periods of time. The organisations involved allowing for the registration
of political parties, constitutional negotiations which were in most cases
acceptable to all parties, and finally the holding of general elections, for
self-government and independence, on the a basis of universal adult
surface.
In almost all of the cases, the negotiated constitution gave
guarantees for values which are normally associated with Liberal
democracy. These are supremacy and automy of a representative national
assembly, independence of the judiciary, separation of powers of the
executive, parliament and judiciary, checks and balance between these
three branches for government, freedom of the press, freedom of
association, freedom of conscience and many other basic human rights.
The constitutions also incorporated bills of right. In short almost all these
former colonies had made a giant step towards building a foundation for
liberal democratic governments.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s almost all of these countries had
abandoned multi-party politics. A number of them were under' military
dictatorship; others were governed by authoritarian single political parties;
while the rest were under one personnel rule. Indeed it was only in the
Gambia, Senegal and Botswana that multi-party politics was still being
practiced.
The collapse of multi-party politics in sub-Saharan countries were
accompanied with severe repression of the general population and an
abuse of other basic human rights. Besides, the economies of these
countries, which at independence were relatively stronger, began to
decline rapidly. In the meantime, corruption among government officials
became endemic; while most of the socio-physical infrastructure, such as
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The collapse of multi-party politics in sub-Saharan countries were
accompanied with severe repression of the general population and an
abuse of other basic human rights. Besides, the economies of these
countries, which at independence were relatively stronger, began to
decline rapidly. In the meantime, corruption among government officials
became endemic; while most of the socio-physical infrastructure, such as
roads, education and health services simply broke down. The general
decline of economic growth and the collapse of various socio-physical
infrastructure in sub-Saraha Africa have been attributed to bad governance
and a lack of democracy. Although the West was aware of the rampant
nature of bad governance and authoritarianism in Africa, it failed to
condemn the paractices forcefully. Indeed, in some cases the West
participated in propping-up and supporting some of the worst dictators in
the region. This was partly due to the ideological rivalry between the
West and the former 'Communist block' — a rivalry whose main
purpose was to secure military strategic positions and markets in the
region. But despite the reluctance of the west to forcefully condemn, and
in some cases stop supporting authortarianism and bad governance in
Africa, domestically, a number of groups had started agitating for change
as early and mid 1960s. In most cases, the nature of change agitated for by
these groups was never clearly defined; nor was the nature of change
sought universal.
Nevertheless, when the former 'Communist block' collapsed in the
late 1980s the West saw no more need to prop-up or support authoritative
regimes in Africa. Instead, the West began to forcefully promote the
values which have been associated with liberalism ever since, namely,
liberilization of the economy, transparency, accountability and multi-
party politics. It was these liberal ideas that the internal groups which had
all along agitated for change finally embraced. Suddenly, the interest of
the West and those of the internal groups agitating for change converged.
A combined pressure of these two forces finally forced authoritarian
leaders in the region to accept change to multi-partyism.
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of African countries
have adopted multi-party 'democracy'. In some of these countries,
successful national elections involving more than one political parties
have been held. In others, similar elections are in the process of being
conducted. In some of the countries where successful general elections
have been conducted, the former authoritarian leaders have been
defeated; while in others the incumbents retained their positions.
Given the fact that a majority of these countries which are now
reverting to multi-partysim initially gained their political independence
from colonial rule through a similar system before reverting to single-
party dictatorship, why should we be optimistic this time round that
competitive party politics is going to be sustained in the region? What
factors led to the initial attempts to establish liberal democracy in the
continent? What factors led to their collapse? Have these militating
factors been eradicated? What are the objective material conditions
necessary for the rise and sustainance of liberal democracy? By attempting
to answer the above questions, this paper seeks to assess the future
prospects of multi-party democracy in Africa. In the process, we hope to
contribute to the on-going debate in the democratization process in the
region.
II The theory of liberal democracy
In order to be able to appropriately assess the future prospects of
multi-partyism in Africa, it is important to understand the theory of
liberal democracy and its historical development, especially from its
classical birth place - the West. This is because those who agitate for multi-
partyism hope that the system is likely to transform African societies into
liberal democratic societies. But, first, let's begin by understanding what is
meant by democracy in general.
In its simplistic and original sense, the concept democracy is derived
from the Greek work demokmtia which literally means "rule by the
people" (Dahl 1989, 3). This form of governance was first practiced by the
ancient Greek City-States, especially Athens, towards the middle of the
fifth Century B.C. (Plato 1987, 26; Dahl 1989,3). According to the Athenian
democracy, 'the people' comprised of adult male citizens of the entire City-
State. The people made up the total voting population.
Within this body of voting, citizens popular control was complete.
This is because the concept of representation was unknown among the
Greeks. The entire voting adult male citizens was the Assembly in
Athens; and the Assembly was the sovereign body. Every adult male
citizen had a right to attend the Assembly, participate in the deliberations,
and vote on all political decisions. Although the Assembly, was the
sovereign body, it was not practicable for it to meet too often. In theory it
was supposed to meet ten times a year. However, in practice it met more
often, though probably never more than once a week.
To deal with the matters of the state between meetings, such as
routine and financial matters, and to draft business for meetings of the
Assembly, there was a Council of Five Hundred. This was further divided
into committees of fifty. Each Committee was responsible for carrying on
public business during one-tenth of the year (Plato 1987, 26-27).
Membership to the Council was chosen by lot from the citizen body.
Membership was limited to one year; and no citizen was expected to hold
membership more than twice.
Law-Courts were also under popular control of the citizen body.
Nearly all cases were tried before pannels of jurors drawn by a system of
mixed lot and elections from the citizen body; and before these pannels
the magistrates could be tried for any irregularities committed during their
year of office (Plato 1987, 27). This form of complete popular control of
governance has never been practiced elsewhere before or since the ancient
Anthens (Plato 1987, 27; Dahl 1989,13). Although the principle of popular
control appears to have been quite well grounded in the Athenian
democracy, the system was neither complete nor liberal. The immediate
problem was with what really constituted the people.
According to Desmond Lee, the translator of Plato's Republic, at the
peak of ancient Athenian democracy, the City-State had a population of
between 200-300,000 people; out of this, 60 - 80,000 were 'metics'. 'Metics'
were those who although they resided in the city, could not qualify for
citizenship because they had been born elsewhere. Both the slaves and
'metics1 were not entitled to vote. Besides, women also did not qualify to
vote. It is estimated that the voting population was roughly 35-45,000
people only. In modern standards, this limited suffrage would definitely
be regarded undemocratic. This means that in its modern simplistic sense
democracy can be defined to mean 'rule by the majority', depending on
how this majority is arrived at.
Another limitation of the ancient Athenian democracy is that the
system was liberal. Within the Athenian body politics, there was no room
for competitive party politics. The entire voting population was the
Assembly and the Assembly was sovereign; so there was really no need
for political parties. There were, however, factions based on family ties
and friendship (Dahl 1989,20-21).
The reason the Athenians were able to evolve this type of
democracy was because their City-State was relatively smaller than the
current modern nation-states, both in terms of population and region size.
The society also was relatively more self-sufficient. The society had a large
population of slaves whose labour power could be appropriated by the
citizens to produce adequate goods for the society. The other large
population of 'metics' also paid taxes which financed the affairs of the
state. Finally, women also provided some form of labour, since they did
qualify to vote. The contributions of these three different categories of the
Athenian society - slaves, metics, and women - to the material well-being
of the society, thus made it possible for adult male citizens of Athens to
form the Assembly. In this context it was possible for the Athenian adult
male citizens to spend most of their time deliberating on matters of state
in the Assembly, without worrying as to whether or not a part of their
labour power was required in the production of material goods for the
society.
The Greek City-State democracies collapsed as a result of the
expansion of the Roman Empire. In their places, emerged a new form of
governance, namely, republicanism. The philosphical content of
republicanism may be traced to Aristotle. But in practice, republicanism is
a combination of classical Greek City-State democracies, representative
government, and aristocratic and monarchical rule (Dahl 1989, 24). The
central idea that the republican tradition borrowed from Aristotle was his
famous philosophical assertion that "man is by nature a social and
political animal". In order for men to fulfill their potentialities, human
beings must live together in a political association; a good man must also
be a good citizen; a good polity is an association constituted by good
citizens; a good citizen possesses the quality of civic virtue; virtue is the
predisposition to seek good of all in puletic matters; a good polity,
therefore, is one that not only reflects, but also promotes the virtue of its
citizens (Dahl 1989, 25). But the republicans acknowledged the fragility of
civic virtue. They saw the continuous competition between good polity
and civic virtue. They noted that there were possibilities for people or
their leaders to become corrupt. This would lead to the decay of the civic
virtue; it would make a republic, impossible to sustain.
A major threat to civic virtue, according to republicans, is generated
by factions and political conflicts. These in turn, result from the fact that
the people is not a perfectly homogenenous body, with identical interests.
The people is normally divided into an aristocratic or oligarchic elements
and democratic or popular component - the few and the many - each
with somewhat different interests. Given the diversity of the body politic,
it is the duty of republicans to design a constitution that reflect and
somehow balances the interests of the one, the few and the many by
providing for a mixed government of democracy, aristocracy, and
monarchy, so constituted that all the three components will finally concur
in the good of all" (Dahl 1989, 25). The constitution of the republican
Rome with its system of consuls, senate and tribunes of the people was
modelled along these lines. The same model was later adopted by the
British constitution in the eighteenth century.
Although the republican tradition justified its constitutional model
of mixed government on the need to maintain the fragility of civic virtue,
it is important to note that the constitution of republican Rome was
largely influenced by the social content of the Roman society. The ancient
republican society of Rome was divided along distinct social classes. These
included the monarchy, aristocracy, citizens, commoners, serfs and slaves.
Given the nature of the Roman society, 'democracy' if it had to be
practiced, it was possible only if the various interests were represented.
But these interests could not be represented within one assembly of 'the
people1. The distinct social class divisions of the Roman society made this
inappropriate, and hence the constitutional arrangement of mixed
government. Like was the case in the ancient Greek City-State
democracies, the republican Rome also was a non liberal 'democracy'.
Liberal democracy traces its origins from the liberal pholosophy of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; from the republican tradition;
from the idea of representative government; and from classical Greece.
Besides these sources, the objective material conditions which facilitated
the rise of liberal were the industrial revoultion and emergence of the
bourgeoisie as an hegemonic social class. The original birth place of this
new development was England (Macpherson 1966; Nabudere 1978; Dahl
1989).
In the mid seventeenth century, the manufacturing class in
England, hitherto sandwitched between the landed aristocracy and
merchants, managed to evolve into a bourgeoisie, although still in
embryoic stage. This development became possible because, the
merchants, despite having accumulated a large amount of capital decided
to purchase land instead of investing in manufacturing. The rapid
acquisition of land by the merchants forced a large rural population into
urban centres as free labour (Nabudere 1978, 26). The arrival of this new
free and cheap labour into the urban centres helped to boost the
manufacturing sector. This in turn led to new investments into research
in science and industry, and into the invention of new machines. The
process eventually unleashed the industrial revolution. The industrial
revolution brought into being a new system of property relations,
especially between labour and capital (Nabudere 1978,27).
Once the bourgeoisie emerged, it began to demand the dismantling
of the old restriction which had been imposed by the merchants. It
demanded laissez-faire. The bourgeoisie readily found liberal
philosophies both in politics and economics which justified their position.
These included the literary works of writers such as John Locke, Jean
Jacque Rousseau, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Montesquiue, and Adam
Smith.
One of the liberal theories upon which the bourgeoisie based its
position was utilitarian theory. The utilitarian theory brows from the
ancient Greek philosophy, especially from Aristotle. Aristotle had argued
that the human essence is activity in pursuit of a conscious, rational
purpose. This, the utilitarians changed; they now asserted that the
essence of rational behaviour was maximization of individual utilities.
So the human essence was rational action which maximized utilities
(Macpherson 1966, 50).
Utilitarian theory assumed that men's desires for all kinds of
satisfaction are naturally unlimited; so men will infact go on seeking to
maximize them. Since desires were unlimited, the means of satisfying
them would always be scarce. The task of the bourgeoisie, therefore, was
to find the system which would employ the scarce means to produce the
maximum satisfactions. The problem was solved by demonstrating that
the way to maximize utilities over the whole of a society, was to leave
everything to a competitive market economy, upheld by a liberal state.
According to C.B. Macpherson, "the justifying theory of liberal democracy
has leaned heavily on this theory of maximization ever since."
(Macpherson 1966, 50-51).
The reason the bourgeoisie insisted on establishing a competitive
market economy, upheld by a liberal state was because it felt this was the
only way by which it could dismantle the restrictions which had been
imposed by merchant capital. In the place of restrictions, the bourgeoisie
wanted a liberal society in which men were free to make choice. These
included a choice of the type of government to govern; a choice of
candidates to be elected into the government; a choice of political parties
to belong; a choice of whom to work for and do business with; a choice of
goods to purchase with the incomes earned; a choice of religion, and a
choice of where to live. In this type of society, the bourgeoisie expected to
establish its hegemony.
To make a liberal society to function, you needed a government.
But a government was to be put in a market situation. It was to be treated
as the supplier of certain political goods — not only political goods of law
and order in general — but other specific goods demanded by those who
had the upper hand in running that particular kind of society
(Macpherson 1966, 8). The specific political goods demanded of the
government were laws and regulations, and tax structure which could
make the market society work. The other political goods included state
services such as defence, education, sanitation and a transport network
that could make the system run efficiently and profitably. In order to
ensure that the government supplied these political goods, the power was
to be put into the hands of men who were made subject to periodic
elections involving a free choice of candidates and political parties. To
make the political choices an effective one, there had to be certain liberties.
These included freedom of association, freedom to form political parties,
freedom of speech and publication. The freedom of speech and
publication were particularly paramount because without them, the
freedom of association would have been of no use.
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This, then, is how the liberal state came into being. It did not
emerge peaceully and suddenly. It required a revolution to bring it about.
In England this tobk place in the seventeenth century, in America in the
eighteenth century, and in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. It spread to most Western countries through a variety of
methods sometimes within these centuries (Macpherson 1966, 8). In each
of the Western countries the liberal state spread, it became influenced by
the objective material conditions and cultures obtaining in each country,
but its basic tenets and mission remained the same.
There was really nothing democratic about the liberal state. For a
long time, the franchise was confined to men of substance (mainly the
bourgeoisie) to ensusre that the government was responsive to their
choices. In almost all the cases where a liberal state was established, the
other subordinate social classes and women lacked the vote. The vote was
granted to these social classes and women only once the bourgeoisie was
satisfied that the liberal state was fully established and the other
subordinate social classes would not use their vote to overthrow the
liberal state. Women on the other hand, were franchised only when a
majority of them began to leave the home and obtain wage employment.
The franchisation of the subordinate social classes and women also
did not come easily and quickly. The process was brought about by the
very logic of the market system. The subordinate social classes who lacked
the vote saw that they had no weight in the political market; without the
vote, their interests could not be consulted by the liberal state.
Using the general liberties of freedom of association, those who
lacked the vote began to organize themselves to demand it. And when
they did so, the system found no defensible ground for withholding the
vote from them. This was because, the "liberal society had always justified
itself as providing equal individual rights and equality of opportunity
(Macpherson 1966, 9). The democratization process of the liberal state in
Western Europe took a long period of time. In some of the countries,
genuine liberal democratic state was not achieved until late in the
nineteenth century. The female half of the population had to wait even
much longer to be franchised.
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For example, until the second decade of the twentieth century, only
New Zealand (1893) and Australia (1902) had extended the suffrage to
women in national elections. (South Australia did so in 1894). In France
and Belgium, in fact, women did not gain the suffrage in national
elections until after the second world war. In Switzerland, where
universal suffrage was legally established for males in 1848, well before
any other country had done so, the suffrage in nationalf elections was not
guaranteed for women until 1971. And in the United States of America,
blacks were excluded from voting until early 1960s (Dahl 1989,129, 235).
To summarize: the emergence of liberal democracy in Western
Europe required, first, the establishment of a competitive market society
upheld by a liberal state. The establishment of a liberal state was preceded
by the emergence of a national bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie
determined, through periodic competitive elections, who among its
members could be entrusted with power to manage the affairs of the
liberal state. The sole purpose of the liberal state was to ensure that the
market society functioned efficiently and profitably. During the initial
period of these developments, a majority of the population was excluded
from voting process. It was once the liberal society had been fully
established and accepted by the majority of the population that the
bourgeoisie submitted to the demands of the subordinate social class and
women to acquire the vote. In short, " it was the liberal state that was
democratised and in the process, democracy was liberalized" (Macpherson
1966,5). Given this background, how, then can we understand the Africa
situation?
Ill The African situation
In Africa, one of the major transforming factors was colonialism.
Colonialism transformed African societies in two major ways. Firstly, it
effectively brought African societies into the world capitalist system.
Secondly, it created new nation-states out of various multi-nationalities,
and imposed a colonial state on them. In almost all the cases, the various
nationalities which were grouped together into new nation-states had
very little in common, except that all of them were pre-capitalist societies.
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The way in which capitalism developed in Africa differed quite
widely from the way in which it took place in Europe. Whereas in
England, its classical birth place, capitalism emerged as a result of the
initiatives of a small stratum of the national bourgeoisie, in Africa, the
process was brought about through the colonial state. Eager to make the
new colonies economically viable and profitable, the colonial state began
by imposing taxes on the indigenous population and also by propping-up
an entrepreneural class.
The new entrepreneural class was initially recruited largely from
the colonising nation. The methods of recruitment took various forms.
In the colonies where large-scale commercial agriculture was possible, for
example in Eastern and Southern Africa, white colonial settlements were
encouraged; whereas in other colonies, the new immigrants were given
monopolies in commerce and manufacture of primary goods (Brett, 1973;
Cliffe and Lawrence, 1977; Sorrenson, 1968).
In order to be able to pay the imposed taxes, a large population of
able bodied indigenous Africans was forced to go out and look for wage
employment (Van Zwanenberg, 1975). Within a short period, therefore,
the colonial state had managed to create two distinct social classes
necessary for a capitalist development — wage labourers on the one hand,
and owners of capital on the other. The capitalist relations of production
was thus set in motion. - .
Although the colonial"market societies were relatively competitive
and colonial state fairly liberal, the class content of capitalist development
in the colonies assumed a racial character. Worried that if allowed to
compete with them equally, in agriculture, commerce and industrial
sectors, and in public bureaucracy, the African would undermine their
hegemonic position; the colonial settlers in conspiracy with the colonial
state, frustrated every efforts by the Africans to join the ranks of the
colonial bourgeoisie.
Given the fact that the colonial system had successfully managed to
create 'support classes' such as colonial chiefs and administrators, western
educated middle class, merchants, and rich middle farmers, it is
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inconceivable that these social groups would have agitated for political
independence when it did had the colonial state removed the racial barier
to their social mobility. Due to this fact, the racial content of the colonial
capitalist development must be seen as the immediate cause for the
demand for political independence by the African nationalists. The other
factor was, of course, the undemocratic nature of the colonial state.
Although the colonial state was fairly liberal, it was obviously
undemocratic (Tunji Olangunju et al. 1993). Its national assembly largely
represented the interests of the white colonial bourgeoisie. Africans who
were the majority lacked the vote. Moreover, for a large part of the
colonial period, the interests of the Africans were represented in the
Assembly by a member nominated by the governor of a colony.
Given the racial content of the colonial capitalist system and the
undemocratic nature of the colonial liberal-state, African nationalists
began to agitate for political independence. A majority of the nationalist
movements were led by Western education elites. Due to their exposure
to western liberal democracies, their struggles also adopted a language of
liberal values (Anyang' Nyong'o 1993). Generally, Africa nationalists
demanded universal adult suffrage, equal representation in national
assembly, equal pay for equal work, and equal accessibility to land.
These agitations by the Africans nationalists finally culminated into
the granting of political independence by the colonial powers in the late
1950s and early 1960s. In the former British colonies, the process leading to
full political independence was preceded by constitutional negotiations
among various political parties on the one hand, and between these
political parties and the colonials office in England on the other. In most
cases, a majority of the political parties represented the interests of various
ethnic and racial groups. The colonial office on the other hand was more
concerned with how the interests of the British would be protected in the
post colonies (Oginga Odinga 1971).
The African nationalists who took over the post-colonial state were
not a part of the colonial bourgeoisie. A majority of them were members
of the middle classes; while others were those who had been politicized
through labour movements. As members of the petty-bourgeoisie, their
economic base had largely been formal wage or incomes earned from
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small businesses. Yet the immediate post colonial state they inherited was
a relatively well developed liberal state which upheld a fairly competitive
market society. Given the fact that the decolonization process in Africa
involved the actual physical exclusion of the colonial bourgeoisie from
the affairs of the state, majority of its members decided to sell their
properties or transfer their capital outside the region. The massive
emmigration of the colonial bourgeoisie created a void within the social
content of the immediate post-colonial societies in Africa: now you had a
liberal democratic state and a fairly competitive market economy run by a
petty-bourgeoisie, but without the physical presence of a national
bourgeoisie.
The petty-bourgeoisie by its very nature is a social category without
a well defined class interests. In the marxian tradition, the petty-
bourgeoisie has the tendency to identify its interests temporary with the
bourgeosisie, the proletariat and even the peasants simultaneously. In the
case of the immediate post-colonial societies in Africa, the petty-
bourgeoisie adopted two options. The first involved identifying with the
interests of workers and peasants, and establishing 'socialist states'. The
second option was to fill the socio-economic void left behind by the
departing colonial bourgeoisie. In both cases, however, the immediate
casuality was the multi-party state. In the cases where state socialism was
established, the abolition of the multi-party state was justified on the basis
of the logic of socialism; whereas in countries where the petty-bourgeoisie
saw it fit to fill the vacuum left by the colonial bourgeoisie, their action
was justified by various explanations. The explanations ranged from
Africanization of the economy to African socialism, whichever way this
was defined.
By the mid 1960s, almost all African countries which gained their
political independence on the basis of competitive party politics,
involving more than one political party, had abandoned the system. In
some of these countries, government had been overthrown and replaced
by military dictorships. In only a few countries, notably, Senegal, the
Gambia and Botswana was multi-party allowed to operate. The collapse
of the liberal-democratic state in Africa was accompanied with a general
decline of the economic growth in the region. The situation grew worse
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during the 1970s and 1980s, leading some African scholars to refer to the
period as "the lost decade".
Initially, the countries which adopted the option of replacing the
emigrant colonial bourgeoisie with the indigenous petty bourgeoisie, for
example, Kenya and Cote d'lvoire, did relatively better in economic
growth than those who opted for socialism. The relative better
performance by those countries which opted for mixed economy as
opposed to socialism was sometimes alleged to be the result of sabotage of
socialist economies by western capitalist countries.
Nevertheless, these kinds of allegations are neither here nor there.
What is clear, however, is that a majority of African countries which
adopted 'socialism soon after political independence were also the ones
whose economies were relatively weaker, for example, Tanzania, and
Guinea. In the later years, it actually did not matter whether a country
operated a mixed economy or socialist one; almost all of them were
managed by a fraction of the African bourgeoisie or petty-bourgeoisie,
whose primary interest was to use the state power for purposes of personal
capital accumulation.
Admitted, inorder to fill the socio-economic void created by the
emigrating colonial bourgeoisie the Africa petty-bourgeoisie resorted to
the use of state power for the purposes of personal accumulation; but
why did it fail to ensure that the market economy operated efficiently?
Moreover, once a small minority of the African national buorgeoissie had
been propped-up through the use of state power, why did it fail to
liberalize the state, and also made sure that the market society functioned
efficiently? Why is the African national buorgeoisie so anti a liberal state
and competitive market society, yet these institutions would be to its own
interest? In short, is the current African national bourgeoisie capable of
fulfilling the mission similar to that of its fore runner - the European
bourgeoisie — by establishing a liberal democracy in Africa? There are
several answers to these questions.
To begin with, there was simply no way in which the petty-
bourgeoisie which inherited the post-colonial state could have used the
state power to accumulate capital without subverting the efficient
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operations of the market. By the very logic of the competitive market
society, the petty-bourgeosie who manage the state power could not have
accumulated capital rapidly if it had to rely on the strict rules and
regulation of the market. Consequently, it resorted to the use of state
power to avoid paying taxes and customs duty on imported goods; default
in loan repayments, and primitively loot state parastatal organizations.
Secondly, once the original nationalists who inherited state power
used it to subvert the efficient operations of the market, they antagonized
and alienated the other fractions of the petty-bourgeoisie who due to their
in accessibility to the state power could not compete fairly in the market
place. It soon became clearer to those who were outside the state power
that the only way to accumulate capital was by capturing the state power.
The state, therefore, became an arena for contest between various fractions
of the bourgeoisie, with each fraction wanting to acquire it for the
purposes of capital accumulation.
The problem would have been resolved easily through competitive
party politics. Unfortunately, this was not possible because in most of the
cases, multi-party politics had already been abandoned. Indeed, the very
reason why multi-partyism was abandoned is because the system could
have undermined the use of state power by those who inherited it to
accumulate personal capital. The only other option left for those who
wanted an access to state power was through military coups or organised
revolutions.
Thirdly, in order for the fraction who control the state power to
consolidate itself, it resorted to the use of ethnic loyalties and patronage.
The use of ethnic loyalties and patronage has severely undermined the
progressive development of the African national bourgeoisie into a
mature social class.
In the marxian tradition, a social class is defined both by its
economic content and ideological position. A social class becomes fully
developed once it has also acquired a universal class ideological position.
In the case of the African national bourgeoisie, it has not acquired this
universal class ideological position. That is why the fraction which
controls the state power, instead of protecting its counterpart outside the
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state appratus against international capital, it literally strives to render it
bankrupt. The African national bourgoisie, therefore, has no interest in
promoting national capital.
It is safe to say that the African national buorgeisie qualifies as
owners of capital and employers of wage labour; but ideologically it has
failed to demonstrate that it espouse liberal values. Instead, it is still
steeped in ethnic rivalries. As a result, it is anti-liberal democratic values.
Given this nature of the African national bourgeosie, the future of liberal
democracy in Africa appears to be quite bleak. In short, the objective
material conditions and the social context necessary for the successful
establishment of a liberal democratic state in Africa is severely lacking.
IV The Projects of transition to multi-party democracy in Africa
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s there have been various
attempts to re-introduce multi-party democracies in Africa. The new
vision like in the previous period at independence is to transform African
societies into liberal democracies. Ironically, these projects have simply
illustrated the reactionary nature of the African national bourgeoisie.
Generally, projects for transition to multi-party democracy in Africa
may be classified into three categories. The first category are those
whereby the incumbent leader gives in to change to multi-party, but
retains the role of managing the process, while also participating as a
presidential candidate. Examples in this category are Ghana, Cote d'lvoire,
Kenya, and to some extent Nigeria.
The second category are the ones in which the opposition political
parties unite with sole aim of removing the incumbent leader from
power. Zambia is a good example in this category.
The third category are those whereby the process begins with a
national convention constituted by an elected constitutent assembly. The
constitutent assembly is convened to re-write a new constitution and
appoint an electoral commission to manage the national elections.
Examples in this category are Benin, Congo, Mali and Malawi.
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Of the three categories of projects for transition to multi-party
democracy, the last is the one whereby a majority of incumbent leaders
have been successfully removed from office through the electoral process.
The second category also has been relatively successful, although the
method has not been common. The first category has been the most
undemocratic way of trying to implement a transition to democracy. In
almost all the cases, the incumbents have managed to remain in power
through elections which are characterised by obvious irregularities. But
whatever the strengths and weaknesses of each method, there are some
general characteristics which are shared by all projects for transition to
democracy.
To begin with, a number of political parties which emerged during
the run-up to multi-party elections lacked serious ideological positions.
Their financial infrastructure were also seriously weak. Due to these
weaknesses they ended up being identified with personalities rather than
programmes. The file and rank of their key officials turned out to be
opportunists of yester years. They lacked commitment, direction and
vision; they could not explain genuinely why they were opposing the
incumbent (Tunji Olagunju, 1993, 210; Gyimah-Boadi 1994,82).
Secondly, most of the opposition parties which emerged had
predominantly ethnic support. The politics of ethnicity which emerged
quite prominently during the run-up to multi-party election may be
explained by a number of factors. One, it may be the result of a lack of clear
ideological position of the political parties themselves which encouraged
ethnicity. Two, it may be that the petty-rbourgeoisie and national
burgeoisie who led these political parties encouraged ethnicity for the
purposes of mobilizing support. Three, it could- well be that nationalities
living within the. countries ,of Africa's nation ~ states do not regard
themselves as constituting a nation with other nationalities. Whatever
the explanation, the thrust of ethnicity into Africa's political anatomy is a
clear indication that issue of ethnicity can nolonger be dismissed as a
misguided slogan of the reactionery elements of our societies (Tunji
Olagunju et al. 1993, 210 -11; Daily Nation, May 19, 1994; June 30 & 31,
1994).
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Thirdly, the entire multi-party political process has been
characterized by too much noises rather than sober and constructive
debates. Since the completion of national elections, no serious attempts
have been made by both the government and opposition to give the
nations a vision. It is as if the petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie running
the show cannot identify a single interest which can unify them as social
classes. Soon the ordinary electorate will start wondering when multi-
partiyism will come to an end.
Fourthly, there is a school of thought which argues that in order for
opposition political parties to become stronger and challenge the
government, they should unite (Lemarchand 1992, 99). This argument
runs against the very logic of liberal democracy. If the main purpose of
liberalizing and democratizing the state is to create conditions for
accountability and transparency, then what purpose will be served by
uniting opposition political parties. Those arguing for the unification of
the opposition want to ignore the ideological bankruptcy of the opposition
political parties. A liberal democratic state is a market for political goods.
If a political party wants to sell its political goods, it must demonstrate that
its goods are superior to those of other political parties. In the final
analysis therefore, it is not the number of political parties in the political
market place, rather it is the kind of programmes and vision they sell to
the electorate that determines their growth and survival.
Finally, there is no doubt that without the additional pressure from
the international community these projects for transition to multi-party'
democracy could not have come this far. The national bourgeoisie must
understand that it is not every day that the interest of international capital
converge with those of national capital. The two forms of capital are often
opposed to one another. Those agitating for change in Africa cannot
continue to rely on foreign support. Opposition political parties in Africa
must learn to build support from within, because in the final analysis any
viable democracy in Africa must be home grown.
V Towards a realistic democratic formular in Africa
All this is not intended to mean that a democratic form of
governance is impossible in Africa. On the contrary all that is being said is
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that it is futile to blindly assume that a liberal democratic state is viable in
the region, evert when it can be scientifically demonstrated that the
objective material conditions necessary for that form of governance is
lacking. At the beginning of this article I indicated that according to the
classical origin of the concept, democracy simply means.'rule by the
people'. The immediate problem is with the phrase"the people". Who
constitute 'the people' in a democracy?
In the liberal tradition, especially in John Locke and Jean Jacque
Ronsseau, the beginning of a body politic is the establishment of a
covenant through a social contract. Such a social contract is entered into
by the people interested in creating a body politic, and between the people
and their governments. In the United States of America, this event was
literally performed by the Pilgrim Fathers on the Mayflower in 1620
(Ronsseau 1950).
According to the liberal philosophy, the reason people enter into a
social contract among themselves and with their rulers is because every
man is born independent, free and equal. As such no man has the right to
subject another to a political power without consent (Locke 1966, 49).
Furthermore, by the very logic of the natural freedom, equality and
independence inherent in man, a people who enter into a covenant is
sovereign. When a people surrender some of its powers to the rulers it
does not loose its sovereignity. It merely surrender some of its powers to
its rulers temporarily so that the rulers may use those powers to uphold
the general will or common good for each and every member of the
covenant.
In short, democracy is about power relations; it is about making
sure that the people have power over those who govern them. The task
in Africa, therefore, is to design a system which can enable people to make
their rulers accountable to them. Liberal democracy is just one such
system. If in our case, liberal democracy cannot guarantee us this
fundamental requirement for a democracy, especially when we are also
convinced that the system is unlikely to be sustained in the region, then
there is no need insisting on it.
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From that brief account of the liberal theory of democracy, it
becomes clearer that in Africa, the immediate problem is that of the
national question. For example, who defined African nation-states? Did
the African who constitute these nation-states give his consent for their
creation? What are the fundamental interests of the various nationalities
and races which inhabit these nation-states? Have these interests been
genuinely consulted any time whenever constitutions are written and
states defined? What methods have been used to consult such interests?
What are the objective material conditions of the African body politic?
In an attempt to explain how imperialism can be overthrown in
Africa, Dan Nabudere once suggested that the first step would be to deal
with the national question (Nabudere 1978, 276). Nabudere was concerned
with how the overthrow of imperialism could lead to a successful •.
establishment of socialism in Africa. In my view that is far fetched. In my
case, I am concerned with how genuine democracies can be established.
My starting point, however, is like Nabudere, the national question.
The first question we need to ask is what is the dominant factor in
African politics? Without doubt, in Africa ethnicity, has emerged as the
dominant factor in politics. As we have noted, during the on-going
national elections, the voting pattern assumed an ethnic character. The
ethnic character of African politics may be explained by the failure of the
national bourgeoisie to acquire a universal class ideology. Alternatively, it
may be the result of the natural development of national identities.
Whatever the explanations, the fact is that ethnicity is the dominant
factor.
To deal with the national question, therefore, means dealing with
the ethnic question. It has been fashionable for some elements of the
African elite to deny the dominant role of ethnicity in African politics.
The irony is that while mobilising supporters for political office, the same
elite is ready to use the ethnic ideology; but once they have achieved they
goals, the condem ethnicity. This kind of opportunism is unrealistic.
There is nothing terribly wrong with identifying the interests and fears of
various ethnic groups within African nation-states, and dealing with
them accordingly.
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In my view the more realistic national convention should be multi-
ethnic conventions within each nation-state. Since not all members of an
ethnic group can attend such a convention, equal number of
representation from each group could be chosen to represent the interest
of each ethnic group. The method to be used in choosing the
representatives would be left at the discretion of each ethnic group.
At the conventions, the issues to be discussed should include
subjects such as whether the ethnic group wish to remain a part of the
current nation-state; the fundamental interests and fears of each ethnic
group; the kind of state each ethnic group need; what powers each ethnic
group would be willing to surrender to the state; and the nature of
economy each ethnic group wish to establish.
It is at the multi-ethnic convention that a constitutional
arrangement could be worked out and an acceptable kind of state defined.
There would definitely be nothing wrong if the ethnic groups agree on a
form of ethnic federalism based on grass-root democracy. Such
arrangements have been worked out in Europe; and have enabled some of
the European countries to evolve and sustain viable democracies. This in
my view is the more realistic way of approaching the national question for
the purposes of establishing genuine democracies in Africa.
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